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Race, nation and education
An overview of British attempts to ‘manage 
diversity’ since the 1950s
Farzana Shain*
Abstract
This paper reviews the recent history of English education in connection with British state attempts 
to ‘manage diversity’. It offers a new analysis on points of coherence and tension between the role 
of education and state policies in relation to race and ethnicity. Drawing on the Prevent strategy as 
an example, the paper highlights the role that education has played in the construction of ethnic 
minorities as ‘problems’ to be managed or contained. It is argued that assimilation into a (superior) 
British culture has remained a constant theme (Grosvenor 1997), but has been more pronounced 
in periods of economic uncertainty and geopolitical dislocations (Gilroy 2004). The targets of con-
tainment policies have also changed, from African Caribbeans, predominantly, in the 1970s and 
1980s to Muslims, in general, since then, but race (albeit re-coded through ethnicity, community 
and/or faith) has been a central reference point in state discourses on minorities. 
Keywords: race, nation, prevent strategy, managing diversity, empire, post-colonial melancholia
Introduction
Since the 1950s, British state policies for the management of ethnic diversity have 
been based on a range of ideologies including ‘assimilation’ (the expectation that 
immigrants will abandon their language and cultural norms and practices in favour 
of those of the host society), ‘integration’ (acceptance of the majority culture’s laws, 
customs and values through partial assimilation) and ‘multiculturalism’ (the rec-
ognition of a plurality of cultures) (Cheong et al. 2007). In much of the established 
literature (Mullard 1982; Troyna 1985; Tomlinson 2008) a linear progression has 
been identified, from assimilation in the 1950s to integration in the mid-1960s and 
multiculturalism since the 1970s. There has also been academic debate about the 
extent to which state policy responses since 2001 signal the end or the death of mul-
ticulturalism (Kundnani 2001) and a return to ‘assimilation’ (Back et al. 2002). This 
debate followed the launch of a new official state strategy of ‘community cohesion’ 
(Cantle 2001) in the immediate aftermath of the disturbances that took place in towns 
and cities in the summer of 2001. More recently, the Coalition government, elected 
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in 2010, has unveiled ‘integration’ (DCLG 2012) as its official approach to managing 
ethnic diversity. 
This paper draws on Ian Grosvenor’s (1997) contention which identified that linear 
shifts in policy “are more apparent than real” (1997, 49). Grosvenor argues that “they 
exist in the sphere of articulation rather than in practice” and that assimilation has in 
fact been a coherent, consistent and uniform policy goal running through government 
circulars, advisory notes, select committee documents and political speeches since 
the 1960s (1997, 49-50). 
While agreeing with Grosvenor, and drawing on this framework for analysing the 
role of education in the management of ethnic diversity in the latter part of the 20th 
century, I also argue that since 2001 national policy responses have been much more 
strongly focused on the concrete detail of unacceptable ‘Otherness’ and have been 
translated via an expanded state apparatus into policies for managing and containing 
‘problem’ populations. Ministerial speeches and policy pronouncements on, for exam-
ple, veiling, ‘not being able to speak English’, forced marriages and ‘extremism’, and 
the solutions proposed – citizenship classes and ceremonies, detention without trial, 
visa restrictions and the targeted policing and surveillance of ‘suspect communities’ – 
have been aimed primarily at Muslims, asylum-seekers and foreign students. I argue 
that education has played a key role in the intensified state control of disadvantaged 
populations through the racialised construction of ethnic minorities as ‘problems’ 
to be managed and contained. Ethnic minority students have, since the 1950s, been 
constructed in policy discourses through discourses of ‘deficit’ as culturally deprived 
(Archer and Francis 2007). However, in recent years, educational professionals have 
additionally been asked to engage in direct surveillance of ethnic minority students, 
and this paper sets out to locate these current developments historically in the context 
of broader economic, political and social change since the 1950s. The paper builds on 
arguments developed in a recent book which reported an empirical study of Muslim 
boys and education in England (Shain 2011). The book offers an assessment of how 
and why working class boys who identify as Muslim in England have come to be seen 
as modern day folk devils or as symbol of crisis and change. In the book, I trace and 
locate the emergence of current discourses of Muslim students as ‘problems’ in the 
context of a wider set of economic political and cultural forces including the end of 
the Cold War and the geopolitical change that has followed. The present paper offers 
a deeper analysis of the interconnections between the development of education 
policy and British state attempts at managing diversity since the 1950s. In doing so, 
my overall goal is to offer a historically informed analysis of the impact of the war 
on terror on education – an issue that has to date received relatively little attention. 
My analysis is framed by the following theoretical assumptions: first, that education 
policy does not exist in a vacuum. It is shaped by and contributes to wider processes of 
economic, political and social change. The 1944 Education Act, based on the mantra 
‘education for all’, emerged in a period of relative optimism underpinned by economic 
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policies which were committed to full employment and a political and social commitment 
to the redistribution of equality. However, despite the stated aim of increasing oppor-
tunities for all children, the middle classes were the main beneficiaries of the Act. The 
role played by educational processes in sorting and sifting children through processes 
of labelling and setting, as well as the embedded middle-classness of the education 
system, contributed to the reproduction of existing inequalities. The 1988 Education 
Reform Act arrived at a time of significant economic decline, following the recessions 
of the 1970s. Resorting to a market model and open competition set in motion polices 
and processes that would contribute to an exacerbation of inequalities experienced by 
disadvantaged communities. In relation to both Acts, the designs of education systems 
reflected the processes of wider social change, but education policies and processes 
were also significant in producing new forms of classed, racialised and gendered ine-
quality. The aim here is not to suggest linear or straightforward connections between 
the development of race and education polices and this wider contextual background, 
but to understand how broader patterns of economic, political and social change have 
underpinned the role of education in state attempts to manage ethnic diversity. 
The second assumption is that the economic, political and social forces that un-
derpin state policies are first and foremost global and systemic. Two major and in-
terlinked developments have impacted on the course of education policy in England 
in the last 50 years and are pertinent to making sense of state attempts at managing 
ethnic diversity; the first is the significant economic decline that has followed on 
from the end of the initial boom of the post-World War II period. This decline is as-
sociated with the economic restructuring that involved a shift in the economic base 
from a manufacturing to a service sector, which started in the 1960s and 1970s as a 
result of increased competition from other national economies such as Germany in 
the 1970s and China in the 1980s, and entailed significant costs in terms of unem-
ployment and job insecurity. The second development is the loss of Britain’s colonies 
at the end of World War II, which was largely followed by the active recruitment of 
workers from the former colonies to fill labour shortages created in the immediate 
aftermath of the war. However, the loss of its colonies did not necessarily lead to a 
post-colonial state identity and culture for the British state in the initial decades. 
As Gilroy (2004) has argued, a post-colonial melancholia – the repeated failure to 
let go of its imperial past – has shaped British state relations and policy in relation 
to ethnic minorities. Imperial and colonial notions of a ‘superior British way of life’ 
and the racialised inferiority or difference of minority groups have been re-worked 
through modern day constructions of the minorities as ‘backward’ and ‘refusing to 
integrate’, ‘untrustworthy’ with criminal tendencies, hyper-sexualised and prone to 
over-breeding (CCCS 1982; Layton Henry 1992; Gilroy 2004). As in colonial times, 
some categories, primarily middle-class Indians, have been accepted as ‘model mi-
norities’ (Gillborn 2008; Mirza 2009) and education has been a major vehicle for the 
further success of these groups. 
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The third assumption is that education is generally shaped, but not exclusively de-
termined, by economic changes. As Jones (2009) argues, “schools are places where 
attempts occur to realise the designs of policy – to produce responsible citizens and 
capable workers. But they are also places where these policies and processes have been 
resisted”. Multiculturalism, for example, was born out of the resistance of parents and 
teachers to the racist assumptions embedded in education systems in the 1950s and 
1960s and the unequal educational outcomes that followed. Education has recently 
been the site for organised student resistance to imperialism and war (Cunningham 
and Lavellete 2004) as well as the neoliberal reform of higher education (Gokay and 
Shain 2011).
The core argument of the paper is that education and race policies have some-
times developed coherently and sometimes in tension with each other and also with 
the underlying economic, political and social change that has given rise to them. 
While assimilation into a (superior) British culture has remained a constant theme 
(Grosvenor 1997), it has been more pronounced in periods of economic uncertainty 
and geopolitical dislocations (Gilroy 2004). The targets of containment policies have 
also changed from African Caribbeans, predominantly, in the 1970s and 1980s to 
Muslim students, in general, since then, but race (albeit re-coded through ethnicity, 
community or faith) has remained a central reference point in state discourses on 
minorities. 
The paper is organised into three sections: the first briefly reviews the major eco-
nomic, policy and social developments that form the backdrop for race and education 
policies; the second highlights key policy developments in the field of education in 
relation to state attempts to manage diversity; and the final section focuses in more 
detail on recent policy developments, specifically the British government’s Preventing 
Violent Extremism strategy, known as Prevent which currently implicates educational 
professionals in the surveillance of particular groups of ethnic minority students. 
The economic, political and social context for ethnic minority 
settlement in the UK 
In 2001, ethnic minorities made up 8% of the population, but this figure has been 
predicted to rise to 20% by 2051 (Tran 2010). Britain has a long history of black 
immigration going back 500 years (Fryer 1984). However, it was specifically in the 
post-Second World War period that large numbers of black workers were actively 
recruited by the British state to fill labour shortages following the economic boom of 
this period (Anwar 1986; Layton-Henry 1992). In the 1950s and 1960s, African Car-
ibbeans, Indians and Pakistanis (and later Bangladeshis) arrived to take up jobs – a 
small minority in professions as doctors and teachers but the majority in unskilled 
labouring work such as manufacturing and textiles. These were often the jobs the 
indigenous workers were not prepared to do, and involved immigrants working un-
social hours often for less pay than white workers (Solomos 1992). 
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The conditions that gave rise to this active recruitment of black labour are set out be-
low. Immediately after the Second World War, Britain, like other similar industrialised 
economies in the West, witnessed a period of economic expansion accompanied by 
social welfare policies of both the Labour and Conservative governments (1945–60). 
Internationally, this was the most sustained period of economic growth, and it was 
in this context that black labour was actively recruited to address labour shortages 
(Anwar 1986; Layton-Henry 1992). In Britain, the Labour government of 1945 to 1951 
laid the foundations for the ‘post-war consensus’ by establishing the welfare state 
and adapting the labour movement to policies of full employment. The Conservative 
government in 1951 continued this trend, becoming slightly more interventionist in 
order to achieve economic expansion. By distributing shares and bringing (coal, steel, 
automobile) industries under state control, they claimed to have a national proper-
ty-owning democracy. Whether identified as Keynesian (following the principles of 
economist John Maynard Keynes) or ‘embedded liberalism’ (e.g. Harvey 2009), this 
set of policies was the result of high rates of economic growth which, accompanied by 
a period of political and ideological consensus, lasted until the end of the 1960s when 
the growth slowed down and more and more crises affected the economy.
Britain lost competitive advantage in the global market place from the 1960s 
onwards as unemployment and inflation rose at home, as a result of which the pre-
vious political consensus appeared to be unsustainable. Politically and ideologically, 
the shaky consensus was also threatened in this decade by the arrival of new social 
movements, including feminism, black power and the student movement, and by the 
resistance to racism of immigrant workers and students. It was in this context that 
the state played an active role in racialising immigration, that is, immigration was 
constructed as a ‘black’ problem, and this in turn was linked to social problems such 
as overcrowding and crime (Solomos 1992).
Hall et al. (1978) argue that the end of the post-war liberal consensus created space 
for a new form of political leadership but one that required a more coercive form of 
state to manage the crisis caused by the decline of Britain’s manufacturing base in the 
global economy. The conservative ‘New Right’ government led by Margaret Thatcher 
took up that space in 1979, with the explicit intention of finding a radical solution to 
the economic decline and accompanying social and political problems. The policies 
of the Thatcher administration created consent for what later came to be known as 
a ‘neoliberal’ and ‘post-welfarist’ agenda which set out to free capital from the con-
straints of state ownership and investment. What followed was a radical restructur-
ing of workers’ rights and real wages in order to keep investments profitable for the 
capitalist economy. These policies were underpinned by a global monetarism which 
was promoted by neoliberal economists such as Friedman, whereas the Keynesian 
phase had emphasised state planning and in some instances state ownership of key 
sectors. The neoliberal project set out to disembed capital from these constraints 
(Harvey 2009). 
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Race was a central political symbol in the rise of the New Right. It was “mobilised 
to explain the demise of the post-war liberal consensus, economic decline, welfare 
dependency and a general lapse in social order and traditional moral value” (Ansell 
1997, 26). The classic study by Hall et al. (1978) develops in detail an argument 
about how, through the use of moral panics around race, youth and crime, the New 
Right manufactured consent for its economic and political project of ‘rolling back 
the state’. Racialised stereotypes about black ‘criminals and muggers’ helped to le-
gitimate coercive state measures aimed at the population in general, but particularly 
targeted disadvantaged groups that were also the most severely affected by the rising 
unemployment. The increased surveillance of the population in general was achieved 
through measures such as ‘stop and search’, but this disproportionately targeted Af-
rican Caribbean men, and as a consequence led to further unrest in towns and cities 
in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, African Caribbean youth were being characterised 
in policy and media discourse as a ticking time bomb (Solomos and Back 1996) and 
a threat to the ‘British way of life’.
Race and nation were also central themes for the New Labour government elected 
in 1997. Thatcherite constructions of ‘two nations’ had divided Britain into a privileged 
nation of ‘good citizens’ who were ‘hard working’ and a contained and subordinated 
nation which included ethnic minorities and much of the unskilled white working 
class outside the South East (Jessop 2003). The Blairite ‘Third Way’ between neo-
liberalism and social democracy promoted the idea of Britain as a ‘single’ nation in 
which opportunity could be shared by all. Yet New Labour governments also, espe-
cially from 2001, posed multiculturalism and ethnic identification as a threat to ‘the 
nation’, and introduced some of the most draconian anti-immigration and anti-terror 
legislation that the country has ever seen. New Labour’s ambitious project of redefin-
ing Britishness around notions of ‘active citizenship’, ‘rights and responsibilities’ and 
paid work (Worley 2005) positioned some groups, notably Muslims, asylum-seekers 
and generally those not in paid employment, as outside the nation and its interests. 
By the time the New Labour government was elected in 1997, concerns were be-
ing expressed about the growing inequalities resulting from the neoliberal reforms 
pursued by three successive Conservative governments. There have been various 
debates about New Labour’s legacy and the extent to which New Labour’s polices 
marked a continuation of Thatcherite neoliberalism. Giddens (2010) disagrees that 
they mark any such continuation arguing that New Labour demonstrated a genuine 
commitment to social justice which was missing from Conservative agendas. It is 
certainly the case that New Labour’s policies and measures such as the New Deal 
for Lone Parents, Working Tax Credits, Child Tax Credits and Surestart aimed for 
redistribution, albeit by ‘stealth’. Policies such as Aim Higher, Widening Participation 
and the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant also targeted disadvantaged white and 
ethnic minority youth, aiming to ‘raise aspirations’ and educational achievement and 
thereby help people to get jobs. New Labour did manage a significant rise in higher 
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education participation (15% between 1997 and 2012), but research evidence also 
shows that ethnic minority students end up in ‘new’ post-1992 universities and on 
vocational courses. As with the 1944 Education Act, the middle classes made the most 
of the opportunities offered by the expansion of higher education (Raey et al. 2001; 
Archer et al. 2003; Modood 2006). There were also increases in the levels of educa-
tional achievements of all groups, but the gaps between groups increased and class 
and ethnicity have consistently been found by researchers to be the biggest predictors 
of educational and economic success (Gillborn 2008; Mirza 2009). The UK’s social 
mobility rates have also declined over recent decades (Blanden et al. 2004), so that 
New Labour’s policies did much to slow down the onset of the 2008 crisis but did not 
alter the broad patterns of structural inequality, let alone prevent the crisis altogether. 
The 2008 economic and financial crisis was the platform for the election of the new 
Coalition government in May 2010. With the mantra of ‘clearing up the mess inherited 
from the previous government’, the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition has 
pursued austerity measures with the assumption that the private sector will step in 
to provide jobs for the large numbers of unemployed as a result. But the real priority 
has been to satisfy the financial elite, bond markets and financial assessors. The gov-
ernment’s 2010 Green Paper, 21st Century Welfare, and the White Paper, Universal 
Credit: Welfare that Works, reflect a renewal and deepening of neoliberalisation in the 
context of the current financial crisis and persistent economic recession. Indeed, Hall 
(2011) argues that the Coalition government has taken the neoliberal agenda further 
than any of the three regimes since the 1970s. This intensification of neoliberal policy 
measures, based on punitive conditionality and economic rationality, is portrayed by 
the government as ‘new and innovative’ to restore Britain’s economic competitiveness. 
Education was first in line for cuts in spending: the Future Jobs Fund, the cancellation 
of school building and refurbishment, the abolition of the Education Maintenance 
Allowance and funding cuts in university teaching budgets, fewer university places 
and a massive increase in university tuition fees. These draconian measures have 
disproportionately affected poorer communities the most. 
Race has not been mentioned overtly by the Coalition government, but the contin-
uation of debates about forced marriages, ‘extremism’ and immigration have targeted 
racialised groups, namely Muslims and asylum-seekers, while the targeted cutting of 
public services has and will disproportionately affect all disadvantaged groups but 
especially poorer ethnic minorities because of their reliance on public services. 
Education policy and state attempts to ‘manage diversity’ 
Against the background of economic boom and political and ideological consensus in 
the 1950s and 1960s, education was viewed as a key means of integrating the children 
of immigrant workers, but this integration was to be achieved by assimilationist goals. 
Over 50 years later, the Coalition government’s official strategy for managing diversity 
still promotes the same goal of assimilation, albeit labelled as ‘integration’ (DCLG 2012).
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As is well documented in the literature (Troyna 1992; Grosvenor 1997; Tomlinson 
2008), two key policies confirmed the assimilationist project of British governments 
in the 1960s. The first was ‘English as a Second Language’ (ESL); the second, which 
followed on from the first, was the policy of ‘dispersal’. 
ESL was ostensibly introduced to help ethnic minorities ‘integrate’ into British 
society. Language was seen as essential to this integration; however, ESL was seen 
not just as linguistic assimilation but also as cultural and social assimilation (CIAC 
1964). The Department for Education and Science in 1967 referred to “immigrant 
groups” as “formed by different breeding and ordered by different manners” (cited 
in Grosvenor 1997, 52). Further, this ‘difference’ was also constructed as threatening 
to the educational prospects of indigenous children. Linguistic diversity apparently 
disrupted the learning experiences of indigenous children, but also caused a decline in 
educational standards. The localised concentration of immigrants in some areas was 
constructed as inherently threatening to educational standards, as the 1964 report of 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council (CIAC) stated: 
The presence of a high proportion of immigrant children in one class slows down the gen-
eral routine of working and hampers the progress of the whole class, especially where the 
immigrants do not speak or write English fluently. This is clearly in itself undesirable and 
unfair to all the children in the class ... if a school has more than a certain percentage of 
immigrant children among its pupils the whole character and ethos of the school is altered. 
…. Moreover, the evidence from one or two areas showed ... a tendency towards the crea-
tion of predominantly immigrant schools, partly because of the increase in the number of 
immigrant children in certain neighbourhoods, but also partly because some parents tend 
to take native-born children away from schools when the proportion of immigrant pupils 
exceeds a level which suggests to them that the school is becoming an immigrant school. If 
this trend continues, both the social and the educational consequences might be very grave 
(CIAC 1964, para. 25).
The above paragraph reveals early concerns about the effects of concentrations (seg-
regation) of minorities in some localities and about the resultant ‘white flight’ from 
these neighbourhoods. The concerns led to the introduction of the policy of ‘dispersal’ 
through the 1965 government White Paper (Home Office 1965). This recommended 
that immigrant children should make up no more than one-third of a school and that 
dispersal between schools should be adopted by local authorities. Few local education 
authorities actually took up the suggestion of dispersal by ‘bussing’ children out of the 
locality, mostly because of costs rather than because they disagreed with the policy 
of ‘bussing’ and only 11 authorities had ‘bussed’ children by 1970 (Tomlinson 2008). 
By the mid-1960s, teachers and parents were challenging the racist assumptions 
underpinning education policies such as dispersal and in 1966 the British state moved 
towards an official strategy of ‘integration’ which was defined as “not a flattening 
process of assimilation” but one of “mutual tolerance” of cultural difference (Jenkins 
1966). In reality, assimilation remained a key policy goal. Integration was the aim, 
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but it had to be accompanied by the acceptance of assumed superior shared British 
values. The language of the decade in both official documents and academic work 
referred to ‘immigrants’, ‘coloured populations’, ‘second language speakers’, and as 
‘problems’. Ethnic minority children were constructed as culturally deprived, and as 
having ‘special needs’, and too many of them were defined as educationally subnormal 
(Coard 1971). This cultural pathologising, or the construction of the familial and/or 
cultural background of minorities as inferior or inadequate (Shain 2003), continued 
in the 1970s through notions of ‘culture clash’ and ‘intergenerational conflict’, and 
helped to shift the blame for material (racialised and classed) inequalities that were 
emerging as a result of New Right reforms onto the cultural background of the child.
Multiculturalism and its critique 
Multiculturalism initially emerged, in the 1970s, as a form of resistance on the part 
of parents and teachers to previous assimilationist polices. However, multicultural-
ism was not officially adopted by the state until after the publication of the Scarman 
Report into the inner-city disturbances of 1981. The state institutionalised funding 
of separate ethnic groups and emphasis on culture difference that followed produced 
not only a backlash from the right-wing press but also from the left and the anti-rac-
ists (neo-Marxists), who saw it as a deliberate state attempt to weaken the solidarity 
that had been built across the left and the black community. From an anti-racist 
perspective, multiculturalism was always a double-edged sword (Kundnani 2001). 
It had started out as a defensive survival strategy against New Right popular racism 
but was now institutionalised as a mode of social control of ethnic minorities:
 
Multiculturalism now meant taking black culture off the streets – where it had been polit-
icised and turned into a rebellion against the state – and putting it in the council chamber, 
in the classroom and on the television, where it could be institutionalised, managed and 
reified (Kundnani 2001). 
Despite the state institutionalisation of multiculturalism during the Thatcher and Major 
years, multiculturalism and its counterpart, anti-racism, were subjected to a “discourse 
of derision” (Ball 1990). The explicitly ‘colour-blind’ approach to policy pursued by 
Conservative governments in the 1990s (Tomlinson 2008; Gillborn 2008) fed New 
Right critiques of multiculturalism as a “looney left” obsession (Grosvenor 1997).
The Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988, enacted in the context of this multicultural 
backlash, provoked further tension between official state policy (multiculturalist) 
and education policy, which was profoundly assimilationist. The 1988 ERA “re-
made” education (Jones 2003) through its introduction of the market and ‘choice’ 
into education. However, this ‘modern’ agenda was accompanied by, and indeed a 
product of, a regressive conservative nationalism with decidedly melancholic imperial 
undertones. The Act was based on a conception of the ‘nation’ as politically and cul-
turally indivisible. Kenneth Baker, its architect, when introducing the Conservatives’ 
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educational reform programme in September 1987, stated: “children are in danger of 
losing any sense at all of a common culture and a common heritage. The cohesive role 
of the national curriculum will provide our society with a greater sense of identity” 
(Kenneth Baker, cited in Grosvenor 1997, 86). 
The 1992 White Paper and the 1993 Education Act, Choice and Diversity, a New 
Framework for Schools took conservative nationalism a step further, stating that 
“proper regard should continue to be paid to the nation’s Christian heritage and 
traditions”. And, in the context of wider polices of opting out, parental choice and 
competition between schools, racism in education became accepted under the New 
Right as a market force (Gewirtz 2001). As Apple (1999) has argued, race became an 
“absent presence” in education. 
New Labour: Tackling institutionalised racism?
Against the background of the backlash against multiculturalism, the incoming New 
Labour government’s decision to commission a public enquiry into the racist murder 
in 1994 of black teenager Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson 1999) seemed to mark a 
significant break with the previous Conservative approach to race. The Macpherson 
enquiry’s finding that “institutional racism” was rife in public services marked a 
watershed for British politics. It led to the strengthening of existing policy through 
the Race Relations (Amendment) (RRA) Act 2000 and the Human Rights Act 1998.
Under the RRA Act, which came into force in September 2002, educational insti-
tutions were legally required to prepare written policies on race equality; to assess the 
impact of their policies on ethnic minority pupils, staff and parents, with the emphasis 
on the attainment of ethnic minority pupils; and to monitor levels of attainment in 
relation to the school population. 
Only a handful of authorities actually complied with the new RRA Act’s requirements 
(CRE 2003), and the Ajegbo review of Diversity in the Curriculum (DfES 2007) noted 
that “issues of ‘race’ and diversity are not always high on schools’ agendas” (2007, 
34). Even before the end of New Labour’s first term in office, institutional racism and 
equal opportunities had been compromised into concepts such as “valuing diversity”, 
which in practical terms overemphasised the “celebration of differences” at the expense 
of tackling inequalities and material disadvantage (Mahony and Hextall 2000). By 
2003, Home Secretary David Blunkett was arguing that the concept of institutional 
racism had “missed the point”, and while education policy was out of sync with the 
legislative context in relation to equality, the neoliberal restructuring of education 
confirmed the absent presence of race in government policy.
Back to integration or more assimilation?
New Labour’s approach to dealing with racism from 2001 to 2005 has been de-
scribed by Back et al. as “the new assimilationism” (Back et al. 2002, 452) but also 
as “naïve multiculturalism” (Gillborn 2001, 19). As both authors note, New Labour’s 
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early flirtations with multicultural democracy were combined with melancholic 
appeals to imperial grandness with these paradoxical impulses, according to Back 
et al., producing a contradictory vision oscillating to the past and future by turns. 
Institutionalised racism virtually disappeared from the agenda in this period as the 
Community Cohesion agenda emerged – as a direct response to the civil disturbances 
that had occurred in some northern towns in June 2001. This new assimilationist 
cohesion agenda was given further fuel after the 9/11 terrorist attacks were officially 
connected to Muslim ‘extremists’ and the USA and Britain officially declared a ‘war 
on terror’. 
Education was seen having a central role to play in “mythbusting” (DCLG 2006) or 
challenging mutual misunderstandings between “communities”. The official reports 
(Cantle 2001; Denham 2002) into the causes of the 2001 riots identified the “self-seg-
regation” of Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities as a major cause of the riots. The 
argument put forward in the Cantle Report was that the geographical separation of 
white and minority communities was nothing new but the fact that white and Asian 
people’s lives barely touched was a major factor in causing the ‘misunderstandings’ 
that had led to the outbreaks of violent protest. This segregation did not just threaten 
academic standards, as in the 1960s, but potentially presented a threat to the secu-
rity of the nation. Segregation, it was argued, prevented young people from actively 
participating in processes of local democracy, leaving them open to misinformation 
at best and potential radicalisation and ‘extremism’ at worst. In addition to the cita-
tion of the lack of language proficiency as a major factor in the cultural segregation 
of communities, Cheong et al. (2007) note a shift in terms of the policy reading of 
Muslim communities. What was once seen as ‘good’ social capital – the tightness 
of Asian family ties – is now being recast as ‘bad’. In Robert Putnam’s terms, Asian 
communities possessed too much “bonding capital” and not enough “bridging capi-
tal” (ibid.), that is, they were constructed as too tightly knit and not outward facing 
enough; they needed to build both on their social networks if they were to work their 
way out of marginalisation. 
Calls for a more open and honest debate about Britishness (Home Office 2002) 
led to the engagement of the British government in a project of redefining British 
citizenship around notions of cohesion and integration and ‘British values’. For New 
Labour, this was largely conceptualised and pursued through its policies on immi-
gration, namely the White Paper Secure Borders Safe Haven (Home Office 2002). 
In the foreword to this White Paper, Home Secretary David Blunkett justified a new 
robust system for managing migration, with reference to the need for “us” “to be secure 
within our sense of belonging and identity” (Home Office 2002). However, as Back et 
al. argue (2002), the core of this Britishness, or what is really Englishness, was never 
clearly defined. At times, Britishness was cast as the Other of genital mutilation or 
forced marriages.1 At other times, it referred to “fair play and tolerance”.2 In Gordon 
Brown’s speeches (2006), ‘hard work, effort and enterprise’ were reframed as core 
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British values, again betraying New Labour’s realignment of British citizenship with 
a neoliberal state.
Gillborn (2008, 81) describes new Labour’s final term (2005–2010) as an era 
of “aggressive majoritarianism”, when “the rights and perspectives of a white ma-
jority were asserted” and, in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and its securitisation 
of everyday life, they now felt able to freely voice these prejudices in the name of 
‘integration’ or ‘security’. The hijab, niqab, forced marriage and genital mutilation 
became the subject of intense and detailed debate, not only in Britain but across 
Europe. However, Britain has not quite taken the steps that France has in banning 
the niqab. Parallels can be drawn here with colonial strategies and the emphasis on 
‘winning hearts and minds’ over brutal suppression. However, this ‘winning hearts 
and minds’ approach also needs to be read alongside reports about the evidence 
of horrific mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners in what has been called Britain’s “Abu 
Ghraib” (Cobain 2010). This judicial abuse, torture and war crime, alongside ‘home’ 
measures, including forced repatriation and detention without trial, keep the threat 
of state violence ever present alongside a series of ‘soft’ or consensual measures to 
manage and contain ‘problem’ populations. In the next section, I explore some of 
the implications of the war on terror for education through the example of one of 
the most contentious national policies that has implicated educational professionals 
in the state surveillance of ethnic minorities.
The ‘war on terror’, ‘suspect communities’ and education
In Britain, Muslims have been subject to intense scrutiny since the Rushdie affair in 
1989 but concerns about the supposed radicalisation of Muslims, and young men in 
particular, escalated following the July 2005 London bombings, when Muslims came 
to be identified as a new “enemy within” (Kundnani 2007, Shain 2009). Whereas 
the early Ministerial response to the 2005 bombings characterised ‘extremists’ as a 
tiny fraction of the larger Muslim community, direct links were nonetheless made 
between ‘terror’ and Islam: 
The principal current terrorist threat is from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted 
and unrepresentative version of Islam to justify violence. Such people are ... a tiny minority 
within the Muslim communities here and abroad. Muslim communities themselves do not 
threaten our security; indeed they make a great contribution to our country (Home Office 
2006). 
As I have argued (Shain 2011), the view that Muslims communities do not themselves 
threaten our security has largely been swamped by the more provocative notion, of 
a ‘supportive community’ for terrorism. For example, Home Office Minister John 
Denham suggested that “few terrorist movements have lasted long enough without 
a supportive community”. A supportive community does not necessarily condone 
violence but sees “terrorists as sharing their world view part of the struggle to which 
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they belong” (Denham 2009). Communities Minister Hazel Blears spelled out in more 
detail who the individuals might be in a supportive community: 
It’s the stay-at-home mum, the taxi driver, the neighbour, the dinner lady … the student – all 
of those whose decisions and actions contribute towards making an environment in which 
extremism can flourish or falter (Blears 2009). 
In other words, any ordinary Muslim, even when not directly involved, could poten-
tially provide support for terrorism. This construction of a ‘supportive community’ 
not only positions all Muslims as complicit in terrorism, but articulates in detail who 
is Other to Britishness and a threat to the British nation. The notion of a supportive 
community is premised on the assumption of a unified Muslim community based on 
faith and working directly but covertly against the interests of the British community 
and has been central to the new racist discourse that constructs Muslims as a “suspect 
community” – “a sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention 
as being ‘problematic’” (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009, 649). The construction of 
Muslims as suspect has not only been applied to adults but, as I argue below, through 
the Prevent strategy, a pre-emptive and increasingly coercive and punitive state ap-
proach towards young people is currently in operation. Justified through a ‘security’ 
discourse, this strategy implicates education professionals in the surveillance and 
containment of ‘problem’ ethnic minority students.
The Prevent strategy and education 
Established in 2006 as one of four elements of the government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, Prevent was officially defined as a strategy that aims to stop “people becoming 
terrorists or supporting violent extremism”, and part of an approach to build “strong 
and positive relationships between people of different backgrounds and a sense of 
belonging to a shared vision of the future” (DCLG, 2006). 
Prevent was launched by means of a series of documents and toolkits aimed at 
supporting schools, colleges, universities and other public bodies in the task of chal-
lenging ‘extremist’ behaviour. Extremist behaviour in this context is a term which is 
simultaneously too vaguely and too specifically defined as a problem of Islam (Shain 
2011). This strategy was revised in 2011 following criticism that it alienated rather than 
co-opted Muslims. The revised Prevent strategy, however, has failed to address the 
criticism that it criminalises and stigmatises Muslims. Rather, it has further extend-
ed the definition of ‘extremism’ to any ideology that opposes ‘Britishness’ (Cameron 
2011). The focus of the strategy remains on Muslims despite escalations of right wing 
‘extremism’ across Europe. Prevent funding (£140 million in 2009) has been targeted 
to areas with high Muslim populations and has included partnerships between the 
police and community and faith groups, mentoring for vulnerable, ‘at risk’ students, 
faith awareness weeks in colleges, English-language courses to teach Imams about 
the importance of issues such as child protection (Shain 2011). 
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Prevent has also been supported by contentious militaristic language. “Winning hearts 
and minds”, the subtitle of the Prevent Action Plan (DCLG 2007), was a key slogan 
of the British Army, coined to distance the British response from the heavy-handed 
tactics employed by US soldiers in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. However, as stated 
earlier, slogans such as ‘winning hearts and minds’ sit uneasily with evidence of the 
brutal repression of prisoners of war. The Prevent strategy has been a central tool in 
the construction of a ‘war at home’ with a ‘new enemy within’ through its underlying 
assumption that all Muslims may be susceptible to condoning terrorism. John Denham 
(cited earlier) went on to suggest that “silence can be interpreted as acquiescence or 
tacit acceptance”. In other words, as Spalek et al. (2008) point out, the ‘responsible’ 
and ‘active’ (and gendered, since the onus has been on women to carry this out) 
Muslim citizen is required to engage in internal community surveillance. If they fail 
to challenge words and deeds that may be considered to offer support for terrorism, 
they may themselves be seen as complicit in extremism. 
Educational institutions are seen as having a vital role to play in rooting out this 
terrorism, and a significant part of the Prevent programme has involved the em-
bedding of counter-terrorism police within the delivery of local services, including 
schools, for the purpose of gathering intelligence on Muslim communities (Kundnani 
2009). Workshops have been delivered to local schools and colleges by police to assist 
teachers to ‘spot’ pupils ‘at risk’ of ‘extremism’. In one report, children as young as 
four were identified as “at risk” (ibid.). Educators and youth workers have expressed 
concerns that they were expected to be the “eyes and ears” of security policing (ibid.). 
In the higher education sector, a number of high profile cases have confirmed 
suspicions that universities have been required to “spy on students” (Dodd 2006). 
University campuses have been identified as breeding grounds for terrorism, and vice 
chancellors asked to monitor the activities of their Muslim students in the interest 
of ‘security’. Promoting Good Campus Relations (DIUS 2007), for example, warns 
against the dangers of permitting external speakers invited by Islamic societies onto 
campuses. It is suggested within this paper that such invitees “are able to fill a vacu-
um created by young Muslims’ feelings of alienation from their parents’ generation 
by providing greater ‘clarity’ from an Islamic point of view on a range of issues, and 
potentially a greater sense of purpose about how Muslim students can respond” 
(DIUS 2007, 21).
This repeats familiar themes of a culture clash that have dominated policy frame-
works in relation to Asian and Muslim communities since the 1970s at the same time 
as it introduces the discourse of ‘grooming’ for extremism. In stark echoes of ‘bussing’, 
the authors of an ‘independent’ report recommended to the Blair government that 
universities curtail their Muslim populations in an effort to combat extremism (Glees 
and Pope 2005). As the Times Higher Education Supplement noted at the time, 
the Prevent initiative smacked of “the Cold War use of academics in counter-insur-
gency activities – essentially using academics as spies” (Baty 2007). Fekete (2008, 
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102) has described this surveillance as a “revamped version of McCarthyism, with 
its highly public loyalty reviews and congressional hearings... being injected into 
the body politic, with particular mutations being developed in particular contexts”. 
The dominant discourses of global security have affected the broader priorities of 
educational institutions, especially the research culture and practice of universities, 
not just through this surveillance but also though the targeted funding of terrorism 
studies (Jackson et al. 2007). Giroux (2012) refers to this as the militarisation of 
higher education. 
Nation-building and education
Pre-emptive modes of control have been justified through the discourses of the ‘war 
on terror’, which in turn have supported a renewed project of nation-building. With 
the appointment of the new Obama–Brown coalition in 2008, the language of the 
‘war on terror’ dissipated,3 but it continues to impact on the schooling of all young 
people, especially Muslim children. At the same time, there has been little provision 
for the safeguarding of Muslim pupils, who have been subjected to increased surveil-
lance and harassment. In 2002, Citizenship Education was made a compulsory part 
of the curriculum for all 11–16-year-olds in state-maintained schools. The Ajegbo 
review of Diversity in the Curriculum (DfES 2007) was commissioned in 2005 in the 
aftermath of the London bombings and fears about “‘home grown’ terrorism” (Osler 
2009). The review added a fourth pillar, “Identity and Diversity: Living Together”, 
to the existing three strands of the citizenship curriculum. However, as Osler (2009) 
argues, contemporary racism is barely mentioned in its suggested schemes of work. 
Citizenship education, from its inception, was seen as a possible arena for promoting 
anti-racist education. But it has maintained the social control functions associated 
with the New Right’s initial attempt to introduce it, in the 1990s, as a “cross curricu-
lar theme” (Cunningham and Lavallete 2004). Children are encouraged to be “good” 
citizens and to engage with a narrow domestic notion of politics, but not to become 
“too political” (ibid.). Cunningham and Lavellete argue that the contradictions at the 
heart of the citizenship education curriculum were revealed when school students took 
to the streets to protest at the prospect of war in Iraq in March 2003. Rather than 
being seen as ‘active citizens’ exercising their rights to legitimate protest, they were 
branded by the chief inspector of schools as “irresponsible truants” (ibid.). Some of 
those engaged in these and other anti-war protests were boys who I interviewed as 
part of my research that examined educational experiences in the context of the ‘war 
on terror’ (Shain 2011). At the time of the research, in 2003, citizenship education 
had just been introduced as a compulsory subject. The boys reported a spontaneous 
attempt to deal with the ‘war on terror’ through a history lesson when two of them 
reported, “for a joke”, that they would join the Taliban. The history teacher’s prepar-
edness in this case to discuss the issue was greatly appreciated by the boys. Outside 
of the assemblies there had been little coverage of 9/11 and wars in Afghanistan and 
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Iraq. The absence of curricular discussion around the wars further contributed to the 
stigma that the boys were already feeling within their schools for being associated 
with Islam (ibid.).
In 2006, just before the current financial and economic crisis reared its head, there 
was a creeping defence of empire in Ministerial speeches. In 2006, Tony Blair argued 
that “this country is a blessed nation. The British are special. The world knows it; 
in our innermost thoughts, we know it. This is the greatest nation on earth” (cited 
in Gillborn 2008, 722). Gordon Brown reportedly said, “we should be proud … of 
the Empire”, that “the days of Britain having to apologise for our history are over”, 
and that “we should celebrate much of our past rather than apologise for it, and we 
should talk, rightly so, about British values” (Kearney 2005a; 2005b). Claiming that 
the empire had given Britain a greater global reach than any other country, Brown 
specifically linked imperialism with enduring British values of enterprise and inter-
nationalism (Lee 2006).
Empire has been a significant theme of the current Conservative Education Sec-
retary Michael Gove’s agenda for the review of the history curriculum. In his speech 
to the Conservative party conference in 2010, Gove attacked the current approach 
to history teaching, claiming that it denied children the opportunity to learn about 
“our island story”:
Children are growing up ignorant of one of the most inspiring stories I know – the history 
of our United Kingdom. ... Our history has moments of pride and shame, but unless we fully 
understand the struggles of the past we will not properly value the liberties of the present. 
Gove sought the advice of empire-apologist Niall Ferguson in 2010 to help rewrite the 
history curriculum for English schools. Ferguson is known for politically championing 
British colonialism, stating that “Empire is more necessary in the 21st century than 
ever before”. Andrew Roberts, also approached by the Conservatives, spoke of the 
British Empire as an “exemplary force for good” (Milne 2010). 
Patriotic appeals to Britishness and empire at this moment, alongside a detailed 
caricature of the Other, need to be analysed in an economic and political context. Back 
et al. (2002, 450), writing about the contradictions inherent in the New Labour project 
on ‘race’, suggest that its cohesion policies attempted to reconcile an “aspiration for 
a model of neoliberal economic growth, based on a rhetoric of globalised economic 
forces, with an attempt to protect the social integrity of the nation-state”. Britishness 
tests, citizenship ceremonies and Britishness taught in the school curriculum read 
from this perspective offer a way of hanging on to a sense of national identity in the 
face of global economic competition. However, the ‘inclusive’ politics of community 
cohesion also represents the ‘softer’ consensual face of coercive state attempts to 
contain and manage problem populations (Burnett 2009). From the latter perspec-
tive, educational polices such as Lifelong Learning and Widening Participation which 
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have targeted poor ethnic minority students, ostensibly offer extended transitions for 
young people as they face increasingly ‘risky and complex’ futures as a result of the 
decline in heavy industry and the growing casualisation of work since the 1960s – as 
outlined in theories of ‘risk’ and ‘reflexive modernity’ (Beck 1991; Giddens 1991). 
However, critics argue that these policies are also ‘soft’ tools of containment of the 
very people who are most disadvantaged by changes in the labour market and growing 
job insecurity (Brine 2006). 
Against the background of rising unemployment and growing economic uncertain-
ty, current appeals to Britishness and the history of empire can be read as desperate 
attempts to instil national pride in the British public. This comes at a time when 
Britain’s imperial power and status as a leading Western economy is being challenged 
by strong competition from countries such as China and India and other emerging 
economies (Gowan 2009, Gokay 2009). The forging of a renewed British identity can 
be read in this context not just as melancholic (Gilroy 2004) but as an ideological 
mechanism to deflect attention from a British economy in decline. Patriotic appeals 
to a mythic Britishness help to create the illusion of a cohesive society at a time when 
disadvantage and class inequalities threaten to become stark as a result of savage cuts 
to public funding in the context of significant economic decline. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that since the 1950s successive British governments have character-
ised minorities as ‘problems’ to be managed and contained. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
ethnic minorities in general were blamed for declining educational standards. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, cultural deprivation and intergenerational conflict positioned 
African Caribbean young men as largely responsible for the inequalities that had 
emerged as a consequence of the onset of neoliberalisation of education. Since the 
1990s, Muslims, foreign students and asylum-seekers have been the targets of racism 
and intense disciplinary measures, and have been posed as a threat to the security of 
the nation. From the 1950s to the present, themes of race and nation and appeals to 
ethnic minorities to conform, respect or integrate, or rather assimilate, to a ‘British 
way of life’ have been a constant thread.
Despite the promise of ‘equality’ and ‘fairness’, successive governments since 
the late 1970s have mobilised ‘race’, albeit coded through notions of ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘community’ (Worley 2005) to justify increasingly coercive state approaches to the 
management of problem populations. At the same time as calling for ‘equality’, 
‘fairness’ and integration, recent governments have also ideologically segregated the 
communities they seek ostensibly to unite. Themes of race and nation remain as sig-
nificant today as they were in the 1950s and 1960s, if not more so. The unacceptable 
Otherness of particular minorities is being spelled out in detail like never before via the 
operation in education of strategies such as Prevent. Education has become suffused 
with counter-terrorism and surveillance at the same time as the government’s appeal 
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to ‘fairness’ in a ‘big society’. I have argued that such appeals provide a convenient 
distraction from the current realities of economic downturn and the further decline 
in Britain’s global power. 
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Notes
1 David Blunkett’s speeches in the aftermath of the inner-city disturbances in 2001 called on Muslims to abandon such 
practices. In June 2010, the prime minister announced the criminalisation of forced marriage and a £500,000 fund to be 
made available to help teachers in schools and colleges to ‘spot’ victims of forced marriage. Although the legislation has 
been welcomed by women’s and children’s rights campaigners, there have also been concerns that the legalisation itself 
could send the issue underground and risk stigmatising communities (Gill 2009). 
2 Blair’s ‘Duty to Integrate’ speech (2006); also see Blears (2009)
3 After the failed bomb attacks in 2007, Gordon Brown is said to have developed new guidelines for ministers directing them 
to ‘drop’ the ‘war on terror’ language and ‘banning’ them from connecting Muslims with terrorist attacks due to concerns 
of undermining cohesion (Daily Express 2007); there was also a shift in language adopted by the then Home Secretary 
Jacqui Smith in 2008 when she referred to alleged terrorist activities as anti-Islamic activity (Daily Mail 2008, January 
17); in 2007 (Guardian, January 17), David Miliband described the government’s use of the ‘war on terror’ terminology as 
‘a mistake’.
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